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Abstract. The decoy-state method is widely used in practical quantum key
distribution systems to replace ideal single photon sources with realistic light sources
by varying intensities. Instead of active modulation, the passive decoy-state method
employs built-in decoy states in a parametric down-conversion photon source, which
can decrease the side channel information leakage in decoy state preparation and
hence increase the security. By employing low dark count up-conversion single photon
detectors, we have experimentally demonstrated the passive decoy-state method over
a 50-km-long optical fiber and have obtained a key rate of about 100 bit/s. Our result
suggests that the passive decoy-state source is a practical candidate for future quantum
communication implementation.
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1. Introduction
Quantum key distribution (QKD) [1, 2] can provide unconditionally secure
communication with ideal devices [3, 4, 5]. In reality, due to the technical difficulty
of building up ideal single photon sources, most of current QKD experiments use
weak coherent-state pulses from attenuated lasers. Such replacement opens up security
loopholes that lead QKD systems to be vulnerable to quantum hacking, such as photon-
number-splitting attacks [6]. The decoy-state method [7, 8, 9, 10, 11] has been proposed
to close these photon source loopholes. It has been implemented in both optical fiber
[12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17] and free space channels [18, 19].
The security of decoy-state QKD relies on the assumption of the photon-number
channel model [11, 20, 21], where the photon source can be regarded as a mixture of Fock
(number) states. In practice, this assumption can be guaranteed when the signal and
decoy states are indistinguishable to the adversary party, Eve, other than the photon-
number information.
Otherwise, if Eve is able to distinguish between signal and decoy states via other
degrees of freedom, such as frequency and timing of the pulses, the security of the decoy-
state protocol would fail [13, 22]. In the original proposals, on the transmitter’s side,
Alice actively modulates the intensities of pulses to prepare decoy states through an
optical intensity modulator, as shown in Fig. 1 (a). This active decoy-state method,
however, might leak the signal/decoy information to Eve due to intensity modulation
and increase the complexity of the system.
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Figure 1. (a) In the active decoy-state method, Alice employs an intensity modulator
(IM) to vary the average photon numbers of the attenuated weak coherent pulses.
(b) In the passive decoy-state method, Alice infers the two different photon number
distributions of the signal mode from the detection results of the idler mode, N
(non-triggered) and T (triggered), respectively. The inset shows the photon number
distributions conditioned on the detection results of the idler mode.
Another type of protocols, passive decoy-state method, has been proposed, where
the decoy states are prepared through measurements [23, 24, 25]. The passive method
can rely on the usage of a parametric down-conversion (PDC) source where the photon
numbers of two output modes are strongly correlated. As shown in Fig. 1 (b), Alice
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first generates photon pairs through a PDC process and then detects the idler photons
as triggers. Conditioned on Alice’s detection outcome of the idler mode, trigger (T ) or
non-trigger (N), Alice can infer the corresponding photon number statistics of the signal
mode, and hence obtains two conditional states for the decoy-state method. The photon
numbers of these two states follow different distributions as shown in Appendix. From
this point of view, the PDC source can be treated as a built-in decoy state source. Note
that passive decoy-state sources with Non-Poissonian light other than PDC sources are
studied in [26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31]. Also, the PDC source can be used as a heralded single
photon source in the active decoy-state method [32].
The key advantage of the passive decoy-state method is that it can substantially
reduce the possibility of signal/decoy information leakage [25, 33]. In addition, the
phases of signal photons are totally random due to the spontaneous feature of the PDC
process. This intrinsic phase randomization improves the security of the QKD system
[34], by making it immune to source attacks [35, 36]. The critical experimental challenge
to implement passive decoy-state QKD is that the error rate for the non-trigger case
is very high due to high vacuum ration and background counts. Besides, as a local
detection, the idler photons do not suffer from the modulation loss and channel loss, so
the counting rate of Alice’s detector is very high. Due to the high dark count rate and
low maximum counting rate, commercial InGaAs/InP avalanche photodiodes (APD)
are not suitable for these passive decoy-state QKD experiments. By developing up-
conversion single photon detectors with high efficiency and low noise, we are able to
suppress the error rate in the non-trigger events. Meanwhile, the up-conversion single
photon detectors can reach a maximum counting rate of about 20 MHz. With such
detectors, we demonstrates the passive decoy-state method over a 50-km-long optical
fiber.
2. Photon number distribution of the PDC source
For the decoy-state method, the photon number distribution of the source is crucial for
data postprocessing [37, 25]. Thus, we first investigate the photon number distribution
of the PDC source used in the experiment, as shown in Fig. 2 (a). An electronically
driven distributed feedback laser triggered by an arbitrary function generator is used
to provide a 100 MHz pump pulse train. After being amplified by an erbium-doped
fiber amplifier (EDFA), the laser pulses with a 1.4 ns FWHM duration and 1556.16 nm
central wavelength pass through a 3 nm tunable bandpass filter to suppress the amplified
spontaneous emission noise from the EDFA. The light is then frequency doubled in
a periodically poled Lithium Niobate (PPLN) waveguide. Since our waveguide only
accepts TM-polarized light, an in-line fiber polarization controller is used to adjust the
polarization of the input light. The generated second harmonic pulses are separated
from the pump light by a short-pass filter with an extinction ratio of about 180 dB, and
then used to pump the second PPLN waveguide to generate correlated photon pairs.
Both PPLN waveguides are fiber pigtailed reverse-proton-exchange devices and each has
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a total loss of 5 dB. The generated photon pairs are separated from the pump light of
the second PPLN waveguide by a long-pass filter with an extinction ratio of about 180
dB. The down converted signal and idler photons are separated by a 100 GHz dense
wavelength-division multiplexing (DWDM) fiber filter. The central wavelengths of the
two output channels of the DWDM filter are 1553.36 nm and 1558.96 nm.
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Figure 2. (a) A schematic diagram of the PDC source test. EDFA: erbium-doped fiber
amplifier; TBF: tunable bandpass filter; PPLN: periodically poled Lithium Niobate;
PC: polarization controller; SPF: short-pass filter; LPF: long-pass filter; DWDM: dense
wavelength-division multiplexing; BS: 50:50 beam splitter; TCSPC: time correlated
single photon counting. (b) Normalized second-order correlation function of the
photons in the signal mode. The parameter τ represents the time delay between the
photons of the two BS output arms. The value of g(2)(0) is 0.994± 0.014.
For a spontaneous PDC process, the number of emitted photon pairs within a wave
package follows a thermal distribution [38]. In the case when the system pulse length is
longer than the wave package length, the distribution can be calculated by taking the
integral of thermal distributions. In the limit when the pulse length is much longer than
the wave package length, the integrated distribution can be well estimated by a Poisson
distribution [39, 40]. In our experiment, the pump pulse length is 1.4 ns, while the length
of the down-conversion photon pair wave package is around 4 ps. Therefore, the photon
pair number statistics can be approximated by a Poisson distribution. To verify this,
we build a Hanbury Brown-Twiss (HBT) setup [41] by inserting a 50:50 beam splitter
(BS) in the signal mode followed by two single photon detectors, as shown in Fig. 2 (a).
Both detection signals are feeded to a time correlated single photon counting (TCSPC)
module for time correlation measurement. A time window of 2 ns is used to select the
counts within the pulse duration. The interval between the peaks of counts is 10 ns,
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which is consistent with the 100 MHz repetition rate of our source. After accumulating
about 5000 counts per time bin, we calculate the value of the normalized second-order
correlation function g(2)(τ) of the signal photons, which is shown in Fig. 2 (b). The
value of g(2)(0) is 0.994 ± 0.014, which confirms the Poisson distribution of the photon
pair number.
3. Experimental setup and key rate
Our passive decoy-state QKD experimental setup is shown in Fig. 3. The PDC source is
placed on Alice’s side. The idler photons are detected by an up-conversion single photon
detector whose outcomes are recorded by a field programable gate array (FPGA) based
data acquisition card and then transmitted to a computer. The up-conversion single
photon detector used in our experiment consists of a frequency up-conversion stage in
a nonlinear crystal followed by detection using a silicon APD (SAPD). As described in
[42], a 1950 nm Thulium doped fiber laser is employed as a pump light for a PPLN
waveguide, which is used to up-convert the wavelength of the idler photons to 866 nm.
After filtering the pump and other noise in the up-conversion process, we detect the
output photons with a SAPD. By using the long-wavelength pump technology, we can
suppress the noise to a very low level and achieve a detection efficiency of 15% and a
dark count rate of 800 Hz.
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Figure 3. The schematic diagram of our experimental setup. BS: 50:50 beam splitter;
FM: Faraday mirror; PM: phase modulator; FPGA: field programmable gate array;
PPG: pulse pattern generator; Circ: optical circulator; PS: phase shifter. The detectors
used in the experiment are up-conversion single photon detectors.
For signal photons, we employ the phase-encoding scheme by using an unbalanced
Faraday-Michelson interferometer and two phase modulators (PM), as shown in Fig. 3.
The time difference between two bins is about 3.7 ns. The two PMs are driven by a
3.3 GHz pulse pattern generator (PPG). The first PM is utilized to choose the X or Y
basis by modulating the relative phase of the two time bins into {0, 1
2
pi}, respectively.
The second PM is utilized to choose the bit value by modulating the relative phase into
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{0, pi}. The encoded photons are transmitted to the receiver (Bob) through optical fiber.
Bob chooses basis with a PM driven by another PPG and measures the relative phase
of two time bins via an unbalanced interferometer with the same time difference of 3.7
ns. The random numbers used in the experiment are generated by a quantum random
number generator (IDQ Quantis-OEM) beforehand and stored on the memory of the
PPGs. The detection efficiency and dark count rate of the up-conversion detectors on
Bob’s side are 14% and 800 Hz, respectively. Note that although the PM for encoding
may also induces side channel leakage [22], the intent of this letter is to close the loophole
due to the decoy state preparation, not to close all the loopholes in one experiment. And
furthermore, we remark that BB84 qubit encoding can also be done via passive means
[43]. Such step can be taken in future works.
One challenge in the experimental setup is to stabilize the relative phase of two
unbalanced arms in two separated unbalanced interferometers, which is very sensitive
to temperature or mechanical vibration. We place a piezo-electric phase shifter in one
arm of the interferometer on Bob’s side for active phase feedback. After every second
of QKD, Alice sends time-bin qubits without encoding and Bob records the detection
results without choosing basis. The detection results are used for feedback to control
the piezo-electric phase shifter.
After quantum transmission, Alice tells Bob the basis and trigger (T or N)
information. Bob groups his detection events accordingly and evaluates the gain Qj
and QBER Ej , where j = T,N . They can distill secret key from both N and T events.
Thus, the total key generation rate is given by
R = RN +RT , (1)
where RN , RT are key rates distilled from N and T events, respectively. Following the
security analysis of the passive decoy state scheme [25], the secret key rate is given by
Rj ≥ q{−fQjH(Ej) +Qj,1[1−H(e1)] +Qj,0}, (2)
where j = N, T ; q is the raw data sift factor (in the standard BB84 protocol q = 1/2);
f is the error correction inefficiency (instead of implementing error correction, we
estimate the key rate by taking f = 1.2 , which can be realized by the low-density
parity-check code[44]); Qj and Ej are the gain and QBER; Qj,1 and e1 are the gain
and error rate of the single-photon component; Qj,0 is the background count rate;
H(x) = −xlog2(x)−(1−x)log2(1−x) is the binary Shannon entropy function. Alice and
Bob can get the gains and QBERs, QN , QT , EN , ET , directly from the experiment result.
The variables for privacy amplification part, Qj,1, e1, and Qj,0, need to be estimated
by the decoy state method. Details of decoy state estimation as well as the method of
postprocessing and simulation used later can be found in Appendix.
We perform the passive decoy-state QKD over optical fibers of 0 km, 25 km and 50
km. For each distance, we run the system for 20 minutes, half of which is used for phase
feedback control. Thus the effective QKD time is 10 minutes and the system repetition
rate is 100 MHz. Therefore, the number of pulses sent by Alice for each distance is N=60
Gbit. We analyze the time correlation of the detection results and calibrate the average
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photon number generated in the PDC source, µ0, using the measurement value of the
coincidence to accidental coincidence ratio (CAR) [45]. The average photon number
Alice sends to the channel, µ, can be calculated as µ = ηsµ0, where ηs=19.2 dB is the
loss including the transmission loss of the PDC source and the modulation loss of Alice.
The experimental results are listed in Table 1. After the postprocessing, we obtain a
final key of 2.53 Mbit, 805 kbit, and 89.8 kbit for 0 km, 25 km, and 50 km, respectively.
Table 1. Experimental results. The number of pulses sent by Alice in each case
is N = 6 × 1010. NA is the total number of photons detected by Alice. η represents
the transmittance taking channel loss, the modulation loss and detection efficiency on
Bob’s side into account.
Parameter 0 km 25 km 50 km
µ 0.035 0.036 0.028
NA 4.22× 109 4.14× 109 3.99× 109
η 21.8 dB 25.2 dB 30.4 dB
QT 2.21× 10−5 1.02× 10−5 2.50× 10−6
QN 2.13× 10−4 1.02× 10−4 2.43× 10−5
ET 1.97% 2.81% 3.06%
EN 2.12% 3.15% 3.99%
To compare the experimental results of key rate with QKD simulation, we set the
values of simulation parameters, µ, NA and ηs, to parameters used in the 50 km QKD
experiment. We also calibrate our system to obtain a few parameters for simulation:
ed = 1.2% – the error rate of Bob’s detector; and Y0 = 1.6 × 10−6 – background count
rate of Bob’s detection. The comparison is shown in Fig. 4. As one can see that the
experimental results are consistent with the simulation results. Note that there is an
inflection point at about 31.7 dB, where RN drops to 0 and RT is still positive.
4. Conclusions
We investigate a parametric down-conversion photon source pumped by a pulse laser for
the usage in passive decoy-state QKD. The experimental result suggests that the photon-
pair number of the PDC source can be well approximated by a Poisson distribution.
With this source, we have experimentally demonstrated a passive decoy-state QKD
scheme.
In our experiment, the transmission loss of the PDC source is about 7 dB, the
total modulation loss caused by the two UFMIs and the three PMs is about 21 dB.
These losses result in a significantly reduced key rate. However, there is room for
improvement: if new-type MZIs [16] are used, the modulation loss of our system can
be reduced by 9 dB; we can have a reduction of about 3 dB in loss if a state-of-the-
art PPLN waveguide is used. Aiming for long distance QKD, we can also improve the
up-conversion single photon detector by using a volume Bragg grating as a filter, and
achieve a detection efficiency of about 30% with dark count rate less than 100 Hz [42].
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Figure 4. Comparison of theoretical values and experimental results of key rate. The
loss consists of the loss of channel and the modulation loss and detection efficiency on
Bob’s side. The solid line represents the simulation values of key rate. The stars are
the experimental results.
In addition, the repetition rate of our system can be raised to 10 GHz [45]. These
feasible improvements mean it is potential to perform passive decoy-state QKD over
150 km in optical fibers. Beside the PDC based scheme used in our experiment, there
are other practical scenarios of passive decoy-state QKD, for example, those based on
thermal states or phase randomized coherent states [26, 27, 28]. However, the physics
and applications of these protocols demand further theoretical and experimental studies.
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Appendix A. method of postprocessing and simulation
The model of our passive decoy-state QKD experiment setup is shown in Fig. A1. µ0
denotes the average photon pair number of the PDC source. ηs denotes Alice’s internal
transmittance including the transmission loss of the PDC source and Alice’s modulation
loss. µ denotes the average photon number of the signals sent to Bob, thus
µ = ηsµ0. (A.1)
ηA denotes the transmittance of the idler mode taking into account transmission loss
of the source and the detection efficiency. η denotes the transmittance taking channel
loss, the modulation loss and detection efficiency on Bob’s side into account. All the
Experimental Passive Decoy-State Quantum Key Distribution 9
parameters can be characterized by Alice before the experiment except for η which could
be controlled by Eve.
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Figure A1. Model of the passive decoy-state QKD experimental setup.
Since Alice uses threshold detectors, the probabilities that Alice’s detector does not
click (N) and clicks (T ) when i photons arrive are
PN |i = (1− Y0A)(1− ηA)i ≃ (1− ηA)i, (A.2)
PT |i = 1− PN |i, (A.3)
where Y0A denotes the dark count rate of Alice’s detection and it is about the order of
10−6 so that we just ignore it.
The joint probabilities that Alice has N/T detection and i photons are sent to Bob
are given by
PN(i) =
∞∑
j=i
(µ0)
j
j!
e−µ0(1− ηA)j
(
j
i
)
ηis(1− ηs)j−i (A.4)
=
µi
i!
e−µ(1− ηA)ie−(µ0−µ)ηA , (A.5)
PT (i) =
∞∑
j=i
(µ0)
j
j!
e−µ0 [1− (1− ηA)j]
(
j
i
)
ηis(1− ηs)j−i (A.6)
=
(µ)i
i!
e−µ[1− (1− ηA)ie−(µ0−µ)ηA ]. (A.7)
Define the yield Yi as the conditional probability that Bob gets a detection given
that Alice sends i photons into the channel and ei as the corresponding error rate. Then
the gains that Alice has an N/T detection and Bob has an i-photon detection are given
by
QN,i = PN(i)Yi =
µi
i!
e−µ(1− ηA)ie−(µ0−µ)ηAYi, (A.8)
QT,i = PT (i)Yi =
(µ)i
i!
e−µ[1− (1− ηA)ie−(µ0−µ)ηA ]Yi. (A.9)
Thus, the overall gains when Alice gets an N/T detection are
QN =
∞∑
i=0
QN,i =
∞∑
i=0
(µ)i
i!
e−µ(1− ηA)ie−(µ0−µ)ηAYi, (A.10)
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QT =
∞∑
i=0
QT,i =
∞∑
i=0
(µ)i
i!
e−µ[1− (1− ηA)ie−(µ0−µ)ηA ]Yi. (A.11)
The corresponding quantum bit error rates (QBERs) are given by
ENQN =
∞∑
i=0
eiQN,i (A.12)
=
∞∑
i=0
µi
i!
e−µ(1− ηA)ie−(µ0−µ)ηAeiYi, (A.13)
ETQT =
∞∑
i=0
eiQT,i (A.14)
=
∞∑
i0
µi
i!
e−µ[1− (1− ηA)ie−(µ0−µ)ηA ]eiYi. (A.15)
For simulation purpose, we consider the case that Eve does not change Yi and ei. They
are given by
Yi = 1− (1− Y0)(1− η)i, (A.16)
eiYi = edYi + (e0 − ed)Y0, (A.17)
where Y0 is the dark count rate of Bob’s detection, e0 = 1/2 is the error rate of the dark
count, and ed is the intrinsic error rate of Bob’s detection.
The gains of single-photon and vacuum states are given by
QN,1 = µe
−µ(1− ηA)e−(µ0−µ)ηAY1, (A.18)
QT,1 = µe
−µ[1− (1− ηA)e−(µ0−µ)ηA ]Y1, (A.19)
QN,0 = e
−[µ+(µ0−µ)ηA]Y0, (A.20)
QT,0 = e
−µ[1− e−(µ0−µ)ηA ]Y0. (A.21)
Note that, for postprocessing, the values of QN , QT , EN , ET should be obtained directly
from the experiment. The overall gains when Alice gets an N/T detection are given by
QN = e
−µ0ηA[1− (1− Y0)eµη(ηA−1)], (A.22)
QT = 1− (1− Y0)e−µη − e−µ0ηA[1− (1− Y0)eµη(ηA−1)], (A.23)
ENQN = edQN + (e0 − ed)Y0e−µ0ηA , (A.24)
ETQT = edQT + (e0 − ed)Y0(1− e−µ0ηA). (A.25)
Denote Q and E as the gain and QBER of Bob getting a detection,
Q = QN +QT = 1− (1− Y0)e−µη, (A.26)
EQ = ENQN + ETQT = edQ+ (e0 − ed)Y0. (A.27)
The final key can be extracted from both non-triggered and triggered detection
events, and the key rate, R, is given by
R = RN +RT , (A.28)
where RN , RT are key rates distilled from N and T events, respectively. Note that both
RN and RT should be non-negative, and if either of them is negative we set it to 0.
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Following the security analysis of the passive decoy state scheme [25], RN and RT are
obtained by
Rj ≥ q{−fQjH(Ej) +Qj,1[1−H(e1)] +Qj,0}, (A.29)
where j = N, T ; q is the raw data sift factor (q = 1
2
in standard BB84 protocol); f is
the error correction inefficiency, and we use f = 1.2 here; and H(x) = −xlog2(x)− (1−
x)log2(1−x) is the binary Shannon entropy function. To get the lower bound of the key
generation rate, we can lower bound Y1 and upper bound e1. By (1 − ηA)2 × Q − QN ,
one obtains
Y1 ≥ Y L1 =
1
µηA(1− ηA) [e
µ+µ0ηA−µηAQN (A.30)
− (1− ηA)2eµQ− (2ηA − η2A)Y0], (A.31)
Then e1 can be simply estimated by
e1 ≤ eU1 =
ETQT
QL1
=
eµETQT
µ[1− (1− ηA)e−(µ0−µ)ηA ]Y L1
. (A.32)
Here, we also take statistical fluctuation into account [37]. Assume that there are
N pules sent by Alice to Bob.
QLN = QN (1−
uα√
NQN
), (A.33)
QU = Q(1 +
uα√
NQ
), (A.34)
(ETQT )
U = ETQT (1 +
uα√
NETQT
), (A.35)
(ENQN )
U = ENQN (1 +
uα√
NENQN
), (A.36)
Y U0 =
eµ+(µ0−µ)ηA(ENQN )
U
e0
, (A.37)
where QN , Q, ETQT , ENQN and EQ are measurement outcomes that can be obtained
directly from the experiment and ‘L’, ‘U’ denote lower bound and upper bound,
respectively. Note that, for triggered events we need not consider fluctuation when
using Eq. A.32 to estimate the upper bound of e1. But for non-triggered events, we
must take statistical fluctuation into account, which means
eU1 =
(ETQT )
U
QL1
. (A.38)
In the standard error analysis assumption, uα is the number of standard deviations
chosen for the statistical fluctuation analysis. In the postprocessing and simulation, we
set the value of uα to 5 corresponding to a failure probability of 5.733× 10−7.
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